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In articulating his novel theory of a right to privacy, Professor 
Rickless takes as a starting point several paradigm cases in which 
privacy rights are violated and paradigm cases in which privacy rights 
are not violated.  These include The Loud Fight, The Quiet Fight, The 
Pornographic Picture in the wall-safe, and The Subway Map obscured 
by a raincoat.1  Rickless allows that standard views of the right to 
privacy—“control” accounts, “inaccessibility” accounts, William Parent’s 
“information-based” account, and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s reductionist 
account—can successfully explain why the paradigm cases are, or are 
not, violations of the right to privacy.2 
For example, on control accounts, The Quiet Fight constitutes an 
infringement of the right to privacy in that by training his amplifier on 
the house in which the fight takes place, Jones infringes the fighting 
 * Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
 1. Samuel C. Rickless, The Right to Privacy Unveiled, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
773, 778 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 779–82.  See generally W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269–70 (1983); Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to Privacy, 4 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975). 




couple’s claim to noninterference with their decision that others not hear 
their conversation.3  On accessibility views, The Quiet Fight constitutes 
an infringement of a privacy right because Jones infringes the couple’s 
claim that others not experience and learn about their conversation.4  
Parent’s information-based account explains the violation in terms of 
Jones’s possession of undocumented information that the couple has 
chosen not to reveal.5  And Thomson, of course, posits that the couple in 
the quiet fight simply has the right to not be listened to.6  As with The 
Quiet Fight, Rickless explains how and why each of the standard 
accounts arrives at the right answer in each of the paradigm cases. 
Despite the fact that the standard accounts get several paradigm cases 
right, Rickless contends that those accounts are incorrect.  The problem 
for the standard accounts, and the impetus for Rickless’s novel approach, 
comes in their failure to account for other paradigm cases.  The first such 
paradigm case is The Threatened Loss Counterexample, in which A 
invents but does not use a powerful X-ray device that can look into 
homes.  The mere threat that A could look through a person’s walls 
deprives that person of the ability to determine who will acquire 
information about that person.  Thus, it is sufficient to infringe a claim to 
privacy on the control view.  But surely A infringes no right to privacy 
by inventing, though not using, the X-ray machine.  Similarly, Rickless 
contends that the existence of the X-ray machine infringes a right to 
privacy on accessibility views, for on those views the right to privacy 
consists in one having a claim against others that they not be able to 
garner personal information about the rightholder.  Again, however, A 
infringes no right by inventing the X-ray machine.7 
Parent’s information-based theory fares a little better, as it accommodates 
The Threatened Loss Counterexample.  However, it is unable to 
accommodate a different case, The Ex-Nazi.  In The Ex-Nazi, Goldberg 
possesses A’s powerful X-ray device.  Rather than exercising A’s restraint, 
though, Goldberg actually trains the device on Rudolf’s safe.  In doing 
so, Goldberg learns that Rudolf was once a member of the Nazi party.  
Because Nazi party membership is documented, and one may have 
privacy only in undocumented information, Goldberg’s learning the 
information through the X-ray device does not violate Rudolf’s right to 
privacy on Parent’s view.  But Rickless asserts it does violate that right.8  
Thus, Parent’s account of the right to privacy is unsatisfactory. 
 3. Rickless, supra note 1, at 779. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Parent, supra note 2, at 270; Rickless, supra note 1, at 780. 
 6. Rickless, supra note 1, at 781–82; Thomson, supra note 2, at 304. 
 7. Rickless, supra note 1, at 783–84. 
 8. Id. at 784. 
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Regardless of the problems encountered by the standard, nonreductionist 
views, Rickless is unmoved by Thomson’s reductionism.  On Thomson’s 
view, privacy rights are really just a cluster of rights, which include the 
rights that one not be listened to and that one not have one’s property 
examined.9  However, where another person accidentally comes upon 
the pornographic picture that had been in one’s safe, but was blown into 
the street by a freak tornado, surely no right has been violated.10  And 
where a similarly fortuitous weather event allows a couple’s quiet fight 
to be broadcast to neighbors, surely the couple’s right to privacy has not 
been violated.11  Thus, Thomson’s view appears to find rights where 
none exist, and is therefore an inadequate account of the right to privacy.  
As an alternative, Rickless offers the Barrier Theory, according to 
which: 
For X to have a right to privacy against Y is for X to have a claim 
against Y that Y not learn or experience some personal fact about X 
by breaching a barrier used by X to keep others from learning or 
experiencing some personal fact about X.12 
The Barrier Theory gets the right answer in all of the paradigm cases 
Rickless offers.  The cases in which a privacy right is infringed—The 
Quiet Fight, The Pornographic Picture, and The Ex-Nazi—are cases in 
which a person breaches a barrier and learns personal information.  
Thus, under the Barrier Theory the cases constitute violations of privacy 
rights. 
In The Loud Fight, The Accidentally Amplified Fight, The Pornographic 
Tornado, and The Threatened Loss Counterexample cases, no one 
breaches such a barrier.  And in The Subway Map and The Pornographic 
Tornado no one learns or experiences a personal fact.  In those cases, 
then, the Barrier Theory gets the right answer: No right to privacy has 
been violated.13 
Having set out the basics, Rickless considers several questions one 
might pose for the Barrier Theory.  For example, must the barrier be 
solid?  No.  Must the barrier be erected by, rather than merely used by, 
 9. Id. at 785; Thomson, supra note 2, at 306. 
 10. This is Rickless’s The Pornographic Tornado case.  Rickless, supra note 1, at 
785. 
 11. This is Rickless’s The Accidentally Amplified Quiet Fight.  Id. at 786. 
 12. Id. at 787. 
 13. Id. 




the rightholder?  No.  Must the barrier be morally permissible in the first 
instance?  No.  While Rickless’s answers seem correct, I think that they 
raise some concerns about the Barrier Theory. 
I.  THE NATURE OF THE BARRIER 
Rickless asks whether the relevant barrier must be solid.  He explains 
that the barrier need not be solid by providing the example of The Man 
in the Bushes, who sneaks and eavesdrops on a couple that have 
chosen to talk on a secluded bench so that others will not overhear 
their conversation.14  This is a clear case of a privacy right violation, but 
the barrier breached is the air between the couple and any potential 
eavesdroppers.  Rickless concedes that any number of things may be 
appropriate barriers, such that their breach, coupled with learning some 
personal facts, will constitute a violation of someone’s right to privacy.  
By way of example, he mentions window blinds, smell-masking agents, 
air, and data encryption.15 
However, I am uncertain how to understand the nature of these barriers 
that are a necessary aspect of privacy rights.  Consider the following case. 
Suppose that A takes an interest in B.  A follows B around as B goes 
about his daily routine, and gathers data all the while.  A notes the things 
B buys, the books B checks out from the library.  He casually eavesdrops 
on B’s conversations, retrieves a bit of B’s hair from the barbershop 
floor and runs a quick DNA test.  He does the same to B’s spouse and 
children to check parentage.  He conjures pretexts to interview B’s 
friends, coworkers, and family to find out as many details about B as he 
possibly can.  Through A’s efforts he learns a great deal about B’s life: 
his proclivities, his intellectual commitments, his political views, details 
about his relationships, and so forth.16 
Surely A violates B’s right to privacy.  I think it would be implausible 
to contend that B has no moral right that A refrain from his massive data 
collection and analysis.  When B eventually discovers A’s activities, B’s 
complaint would seem to be that A violated B’s right to privacy, and that 
complaint would be justified.  I do not see, though, that A breaches a 
barrier. 
One possibility is that A does breach a barrier, which is just the sheer 
difficulty of getting all that information.  One might use the difficulty of 
gathering and analyzing small bits of information as a way of preventing 
 14. Id. at 788. 
 15. Id. 
 16. This case tracks an example I use in Alan Rubel, Claims to Privacy and the 
Distributed Value View, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 921, 942 (2007). 
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others from learning other personal facts about oneself.  For example, 
Joe might use the fact that it is difficult to follow him around and monitor 
his purchases and behavior as a way to hide his chronic drinking.  Similarly, 
one might create a barrier to being followed by walking or driving briskly, 
turning often and without warning, and so forth.  Understanding “barrier” so 
broadly, however, would seem to undermine the explanatory power of the 
Barrier Theory.17 
II.  “USED BY” 
Supposing that the data accumulation case does constitute a violation 
of B’s right to privacy, and supposing that the sheer difficulty of getting 
all that information is the barrier that A breaches, it is not at all clear that 
B uses the difficulty of getting the information as a means to keep others 
from learning or experiencing personal facts about himself.  It seems 
more likely that it simply never occurred to B that someone would go to 
such lengths to find out detailed information about him. 
It seems that many of the things that constitute actual barriers to others 
learning personal facts about us are fortuitous.  Consider, for example, the 
efforts of credit card companies to keep others from learning information 
about my account.  I certainly benefit from those efforts to the extent 
that they prevent me from being defrauded.  However, it is plausible that 
many people do not think about, much less deliberately use, those efforts 
as a means of keeping others from learning personal facts.  However, it 
seems that B’s stealing a look at A’s financial records violates A’s right 
to privacy, even where A did not deliberately use the protections 
afforded such records to keep others from learning personal facts. 
The same could be true of the protections afforded medical records, 
educational records, and so forth.  For example, many people may not 
realize the extent to which there are barriers to others learning information 
in their medical records, though they benefit from the barriers.  However, it 
would still seem that others breaching the barriers would constitute 
 17. Rickless responds to the counterexample, which he aptly calls The Shadow, by 
noting that B’s actions occur in public, and are the sorts of information-gathering tactics 
employed by private investigators.  Rickless, supra note 1, at 794 n.45.  This is correct.  I 
take it, though, that The Man in the Bushes example takes place in public.  Similarly, one 
could breach the barrier of a smell-masking agent (for example, with an electronic nose 
of some sort) in public.  I am also uncertain whether the information-gathering activities 
of private investigators render those activities permissible per se.  Being a private investigator 
may in some circumstances give rise to certain privilege rights. 




violations of privacy rights.  Indeed, the same thing will be true of the 
walls of one’s house.  I may not use the walls of my house as a barrier to 
protect information.  I may think of them as a way to keep out the cold, 
displaying pictures, and holding up the roof.  Nonetheless, when A trains 
his X-ray device on my wall and learns some personal fact about me, it 
would surely be the case that A has violated my right to privacy. 
Thus, even where one does not deliberately or intentionally use the 
barriers that protect information as a means to keep others from learning 
personal facts about oneself, it seems that breaching those barriers may 
violate a right to privacy.  Perhaps violating a right to privacy requires 
instead that another person breach a barrier that in fact protects one’s 
privacy, regardless of whether one actually intentionally uses the barrier 
as a means to protect privacy. 
III.  BARRIER-BREACHING 
Rickless states that data encryption will be a barrier, the breach of 
which will constitute a violation of a privacy right.18  Thus, where A 
encrypts data in order to prevent others from learning personal facts 
about A, B’s decrypting that data violates A’s right to privacy on the 
Barrier Theory.  The Barrier Theory does not contain a requirement 
that the encryption must be generally effective, however, and I 
wonder whether using a barrier that happens to not work in a 
particular circumstance will underwrite a right to privacy on the 
Barrier Theory. 
Suppose, for example, that a multilingual couple have the habit of 
conversing in different languages so that they may discuss personal 
matters in public spaces, but without others learning facts about them in 
the process.  Generally this is an effective barrier.  They deliberately 
choose to speak in languages that no one nearby is likely to understand.  
Suppose also that the couple converse in Cantonese in a restaurant in a 
small town with no known Cantonese speakers.  However, there just 
happens to be a person passing through town sitting at the next table who 
is fluent in Cantonese.  It is unclear from the Barrier Theory whether the 
person at the next table breaches the relevant barrier when she 
comprehends the conversation.  Does she breach the barrier when she 
actively listens and translates deliberately?  Does she breach the barrier 
when she records the conversation and later translates it with the aid of a 
Cantonese-English dictionary? 
My concern here is not a matter of mere line drawing; there will 
always be cases in which a particular theory will be difficult to apply.  
 18. Id. at 788. 
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Rather, my concern is that fleshing out the Barrier Theory may demand 
positing a condition that B—the person learning the personal facts about 
the rightholder—take some positive action toward breaching the barrier 
and acquiring personal information about the rightholder.  That is, I am 
not certain of the extent to which a person breaching the relevant barrier 
must act to deliberately breach the barrier in order for a rights violation 
to obtain. 
IV.  ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION 
Thomson argues that the cluster of rights that make up the right to privacy 
includes the right that others not cause one distress by publishing 
personal information (as illustrated by The Picture in the News case), 
and the right to confidentiality (as illustrated by The Inveterate Gossip 
case).19  Rickless contends that the two cases involve wrongs, but that 
those wrongs are better understood as wrongs of causing distress and 
betraying confidence.  Rather than multiplying rights beyond necessity, 
he asserts that we may limit the right to privacy to information 
acquisition.  He writes that “[i]f every moral fact about the dissemination 
cases can be explained without adverting to a right to privacy, then let us 
simplify our moral theory by hypothesizing that the right to privacy 
concerns the acquisition, but not the dissemination, of personal 
information.”20 
I am not sure we can do that so neatly.  Take the example of the 
powerful X-ray machine that can see through walls.  Clearly A’s using 
such a machine to watch B in her home is a violation of B’s right to 
privacy on the Barrier Theory, based on A’s acquisition of information.  
However, we can tweak the case to make it a violation of the right to 
privacy based on dissemination.  Suppose that A trains the X-ray machine 
on B’s house, but rather than watching B and acquiring information, A 
sets the machine to begin broadcasting the image on television and 
simply walks away, never viewing the images himself.  Clearly this 
violates B’s right to privacy.  Just as clearly, it is the dissemination of the 
information that constitutes the violation, not the acquisition.  Those 
people acquiring information about B by turning on their televisions 
do not violate B’s right to privacy any more than the neighbors who 
have The Quiet Fight fill their ears on the wind of a freak weather 
 19. Thomson, supra note 2, at 309. 
 20. Rickless, supra note 1, at 796. 
RUBEL COMMENT POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL).DOC 2/7/2008  3:12:27 PM 
 
808 
event, even though they are the only ones who acquire information.  
It is A, who has merely disseminated the information, who has violated 
B’s right. 
 
